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Abstract 
According to contract theory, exploitative contracting probably exists widely and on a 
large scale, and it generates economic rents. In this paper, I show that the origin of these 
economic rents is heterogeneity in fluid intelligences, and heterogeneity in honesty 
aggravates the situation. Even without asymmetric information and irrationality, and even 
if economic agents have no malicious intent and are always honest, economic rents from 
mistakes in business deals are generated. Some households or family lines persistently 
obtain these economic rents with higher probability than others, and, as a result, extreme 
economic inequality will be generated. This means that there is a built-in mechanism such 
that the level of economic inequality in an economy is naturally exacerbated. Hence, a 
government has to intervene in economic activities to eliminate the negative effects of 
these economic rents by appropriately redistributing incomes among households.  
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1  INTRODUCTION 
 
Exploitative contracting has been an important subject of study in contract theory (e.g., 
DellaVigna and Malmendier, 2004; Laibson and Gabaix, 2004; Gabaix and Laibson, 
2006; Heidhues and Kőszegi, 2010; Koszegi, 2014). These studies show that, if economic 
agents are heterogeneous in behaviors with regard to making decisions in business 
dealings (e.g., consumers are either naïve or sophisticated), competition in markets cannot 
sufficiently protect naïve consumers from their cognitive biases, errors, or mistakes. 
Therefore, some agents obtain the economic rents derived from exploitative contracting 
while others are exploited. It seems highly likely that economic agents are actually 
heterogeneous in such behaviors, and thereby the economic rents from exploitative 
contracting actually exist ubiquitously, most likely on a large scale.  
 The existence of exploitative contracting means that economic rents are 
generated—that is, some economic agents obtain factor payments that exceed costs (i.e., 
extra profits). At the same time, some agents suffer losses that are equivalent to the 
economic rents. These economic rents will lead to two important economic consequences: 
inefficiency and inequality. In this paper, I particularly focus only on the inequality 
brought about by these economic rents. 
 In contract theory, the reason for exploitative contracting is often explained by 
using the concepts of asymmetric information and irrationality (or bounded rationality). 
Nevertheless, as noted above, exploitative contracting occurs essentially because 
economic agents are heterogeneous (e.g., there are naïve and sophisticated consumers). 
Why are economic agents heterogeneous? Possibly because of heterogeneity in the 
intelligences of people—particularly, heterogeneity in fluid intelligence. According to 
Cattell (1963, 1971), fluid intelligence is the ability to solve novel problems by thinking 
logically and without depending only on previously acquired knowledge. The importance 
of fluid intelligence has been emphasized in psychology and psychometrics. 
 Another possible origin of the heterogeneity is that people have heterogeneous 
personalities; in particular, they are heterogeneous with regard to honesty because 
contract negotiations are a kind of game. If all agents are always honest, it is possible that 
no exploitative contracting occurs and no economic rents derived from it will be generated, 
because no honest agent will want to exploit others. However, people have strong desires 
to “win” whatever game they may be playing. As a result, some people may act more 
dishonestly than others, and some relatively more dishonest people may take advantage 
of the opportunities that exploitative contracting provides.  
 In this paper, I examine the phenomenon of exploitative contracting from a 
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broader perspective; that is, I consider not only exploitative contracting but also “mistakes” 
made by economic agents in business dealings. Here, a “mistake” means, for example, 
that a household purchases a product at a price that is higher than the cost to produce it 
plus a normal margin, or that a worker accepts a wage that is lower than their marginal 
productivity would indicate is appropriate. In business dealings, the economic agent who 
makes fewer mistakes wins and the one who makes more mistakes loses. An economic 
agent may win by intentionally misleading the other agent, but in any case, the winner 
obtains the economic rents. 
 The model in this paper shows that heterogeneity in fluid intelligence generates 
heterogeneity in the ability to make fewer mistakes in business dealings. Because the 
economic rents from mistakes include those from exploitative contracting, the naïve and 
sophisticated consumers mentioned in the literature of contract theory may correspond to 
consumers with relatively low and high fluid intelligences, respectively. They may also 
correspond to relatively more and less honest consumers. If fluid intelligences are 
heterogeneous among agents, economic rents from mistakes in business dealings are 
generated even if no economic agents have any malicious intent and all agents are always 
honest. This means that heterogeneity in fluid intelligence is the primary source of the 
economic rents from mistakes. Although heterogeneity in honesty is not the primary 
source of the economic rents, it can be an important factor because it aggravates the 
situation generated by heterogeneity in fluid intelligence. 
 Fluid intelligences are highly likely to be heterogeneous among people. 
Therefore, most business dealings and contracts must be made between economic agents 
with different fluid intelligences, and the economic rents from the mistakes probably exist 
ubiquitously and at a large scale across an economy. In addition, some households or 
family lines may persistently obtain economic rents with a higher probability than others, 
because fluid intelligences are probably exogenously given and biased. This persistence 
generates a serious problem. Harashima (2020d) showed that, if persistent economic rents 
exist, extreme economic inequality is generated unless a government appropriately 
intervenes in its economy. Heterogeneity in fluid intelligences therefore means that there 
is a built-in mechanism such that the level of economic inequality in an economy is 
naturally exacerbated.  
 The model in this paper indicates that a government has to intervene in economic 
activities to eliminate the negative effects of these economic rents and escape from 
extreme economic inequality. Moreover, a government should not strengthen regulations 
but instead should appropriately redistribute incomes among households, for example, 
through a progressive income tax or an inheritance tax.  
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2  MISTAKES IN BUSINESS DEALINGS AND 
ECONOMIC RENTS 
 
2.1  Mistakes  
2.1.1  Mistakes and victory or defeat  
When making a deal in business, an agreement is reached between the two parties after 
negotiations (e.g., after exchanging offers and proposals with one another). At the time 
of an agreement, both parties think that they have won—or at worst, that it was a tie— 
and, even if there is a loser, each party thinks it is the other and not themselves. However, 
from an objective point of view, it is highly likely that, in many cases, one party made 
more mistakes than the other party and one party should objectively be considered to have 
lost. Nevertheless, it may take a long time before the loser recognizes the loss, and in 
some cases, the objectively defeated party may never recognize its mistakes or the loss.  
 Consider a board game such as chess or go. Players do their best to win games, 
but a player is not always able to choose the best move at any point in time. Relatively 
inferior moves are often chosen, at least to some extent. Nevertheless, if a player’s moves 
on average are better—even if only slightly—than those of the opponent, that player 
eventually wins. In such a game, even if the difference in ability between players is very 
small, one player wins and one player loses. Taking this property into consideration, it 
seems highly likely that there are some economic agents who usually make fewer 
mistakes in business dealings than other agents because heterogeneity in the probability 
of making mistakes exists across economic agents. Even if the difference in the agents’ 
abilities with regard to making mistakes is very small, some economic agents will win 
more often than others; that is, economic agents who usually make fewer mistakes can 
“win” business dealings more often than those who usually make more mistakes. 
 
2.1.2  The reason for making mistakes 
Why do economic agents misunderstand and make mistakes in business deals? One 
reason is that households or workers may become more or less confused, because they 
have to deal with information about price and quality in addition to many other kinds of 
related information (e.g., contract details or information on rival products). For example, 
a consumer needs to consider information on monthly installments or supplemental 
payments and additional functions when purchasing a product. Similarly, a potential 
employee needs to consider the term of employment, bonuses, company benefits, 
promotion opportunities, and the growth potential of company when making a wage 
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contract. A household or worker has to decide whether a proposal is acceptable fully 
considering all of this information—that is, it has to make the decision in a very 
complicated environment. This complexity is an important source of confusion, 
misunderstandings, and mistakes. 
 
2.1.3  Misleading conduct 
Because of the complexity of business transactions, many opportunities for exploitation 
exist. Some people may intentionally mislead other people and take advantage of their 
misunderstandings and mistakes. For example, a household may be coaxed into buying a 
product that is actually less valuable than its price indicates, or a worker may be 
convinced to accept lower wages than the level that marginal productivity would indicate 
is appropriate. In these cases, the winners are the seller and employer who have 
successfully misled the consumer and worker. In some cases, techniques such as lies, 
bluffs, exaggeration, and misinformation may be used, and there may be many people 
who use these techniques as much as possible on a daily basis. Conversely, it seems likely 
that there are large numbers of people who are misled in their business transactions on a 
daily basis.  
 Some activities intended to mislead others or to promote misunderstandings and 
mistakes may be illegal, but other similar activities may be entirely lawful. In this paper, 
regardless of whether these activities are legal or technically illegal but in essence are 
practically legal because of weak law enforcement, conduct that intentionally misleads 
other economic agents or promotes misunderstandings and mistakes but is not punished 
by the authorities is called “misleading conduct.”  
 
2.2  Economic rents  
Winners in business deals can obtain economic rents in the sense that a winner can receive 
a payment that exceeds the costs needed to receive it. At the same time, losers receive 
smaller amounts of compensation than they could obtain. For example, sellers can obtain 
economic rents if they can successfully sell a less valuable product than its price would 
indicate to consumers, or employers can obtain economic rents if they can successfully 
persuade their employees to accept lower wages than their marginal productivity would 
indicate. Moreover, winners can obtain these economic rents even if they are obtained as 
a result of misleading conduct.  
 
3  HETEROGENEITY IN MAKING MISTAKES 
AND FLUID INTELLIGENCE 
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If the probability of making a mistake is identical for all economic agents, these mistakes 
do not matter to economic inequality because advantages and disadvantages derived from 
the mistakes are cancelled out on average for any economic agent; therefore, there will 
be no effect on economic inequality. However, it seems highly likely that the probabilities 
of making a mistake are heterogeneous across people and that mistakes matter in terms 
of economic inequality. 
 
3.1  Mistakes and unexpected problems 
Most business deals are not only complex: they are also ad hoc. Conditions vary by deal 
and often change temporally and unexpectedly. In addition, various types of ambiguity 
or unpredictability exist. For example, the following situations will commonly be 
observed during negotiations:  
 
 Prices offered change temporally and differ in every proposal for various reasons. 
 Quality cannot be perfectly tested and guaranteed at the time of purchase.    
 Difference in qualities or functions among competing products cannot easily be 
evaluated by buyers. 
 Payment schedules vary in each proposal. 
 Conditions for the sale of the same product differ in each proposal and can be 
complex.    
 Working conditions are not perfectly or correctly known before a worker accepts 
an employment offer. 
 A company’s future is uncertain for a newly recruited worker. 
 
As a result, each economic agent has to evaluate an offer or proposal comprehensively by 
fully considering many points before making a decision. 
 In these complicated situations, however, economic agents can avoid mistakes if 
they more correctly and comprehensively identify potential problems in proposals or 
offers. But what is needed to discover these potential problems more correctly and 
comprehensively ex ante? It seems highly likely that a higher intelligence is needed, but 
what kind of intelligence? These situations are so complicated that unexpected problems 
are usually hidden in offers or proposals in negotiations because of their complexity, 
variability, ambiguity, and unpredictability. If an economic agent can anticipate 
unexpected problems and reduce their number ex ante more so than the agent’s opponent, 
that agent will make fewer mistakes and eventually win. In this sense, the type of 
intelligence that is most important is one that enables an agent to anticipate unexpected 
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problems and thereby prevent them ex ante. 
 
3.2  Fluid intelligence 
In psychology and psychometrics, many types of intelligence have been considered, 
including fluid intelligence, crystallized intelligence, short-term memory, long-term 
storage and retrieval, reading and writing ability, and visual processing. Among these, the 
important differences between fluid intelligence and crystallized intelligence have been 
particularly emphasized. According to Cattell (1963, 1971), fluid intelligence is the 
ability to solve novel problems by thinking logically without depending only on 
previously acquired knowledge—for example, from schooling or previous experience. 
With the help of fluid intelligence, people can flexibly adapt their thinking to new 
problems or situations. By contrast, crystallized intelligence is the capacity to acquire and 
use knowledge or experience. This is the ability to communicate one’s knowledge and to 
reason by using previously learned experiences. 
 As discussed in Section 3.1, the intelligence required to reduce mistakes in 
business deals is the one that enables people to anticipate, prevent, and avoid unexpected 
problems ex ante. Therefore, intelligence, particularly fluid intelligence is required to deal 
with these types of conditions. Moreover, an economic agent’s probability of making a 
mistake in business transactions will be highly likely negatively correlated with the level 
of fluid intelligence of the agent. 
 
3.3  Heterogeneity in the probability of making a mistake  
Raven’s Progressive Matrices has been regarded as the best test to measure fluid 
intelligence (Raven, 1962; Snow et al., 1984; Raven et al., 1998). In this test, a subject 
(i.e., the test taker) is presented with a matrix of images and is asked to identify the 
missing element that would complete the matrix from among a given set of possible 
answers. The images in the matrix are arranged by a rule; hence, selecting the correct 
answer is equivalent to correctly uncovering the rule.  
 Tests scores vary across test takers, indicating that fluid intelligence is 
heterogeneous across people. Therefore, the probabilities of making mistakes in business 
deals are also heterogeneous, and some economic agents will make more mistakes than 
others. Particularly, economic agents with lower fluid intelligences will make more 
mistakes than those with higher fluid intelligences.  
 
3.4  Heterogeneous fluid intelligences and misleading conduct 
As indicated in Section 2.1.3, mistakes are made not only because of inherent inability 
but also because an agent has been misled by another agent. If there is no correlation 
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between fluid intelligence and the ethical conduct of economic agents, misleading 
conduct will be attempted by economic agents at similar rates regardless of their fluid 
intelligences.  
 Even if everybody engages in misleading conduct equally, the success rates of 
that conduct will vary among economic agents. It seems natural to assume that an 
economic agent with a higher fluid intelligence will more often succeed in misleading 
other agents than an economic agent with a lower fluid intelligence; that is, an economic 
agent with a lower fluid intelligence not only makes more mistakes because of their own 
lower ability but also because they are more often misled by economic agents with higher 
fluid intelligences. 
 Considering the reality that most people are seeking profits in their business 
dealings, it seems likely that many people will intentionally utilize as much misleading 
conduct as possible because this conduct is lawful, at least in the practical sense 
previously discussed (i.e., there is little enforcement of laws prohibiting some misleading 
conduct). If this is true, the number of mistakes made by agents with relatively low fluid 
intelligence as a result of the intentional misleading conduct of agents with relatively high 
fluid intelligence agents may be far larger than that stemming from simply having 
relatively low fluid intelligence. 
 
4  MODEL OF ECONOMIC RENTS FROM 
MISTAKES IN BUSINESS DEALINGS 
 
4.1  The model 
Suppose that there are two economic agents, Agent 1 and Agent 2. The two agents are 
identical except for their fluid intelligences: the fluid intelligence of Agent 1 is higher 
than that of Agent 2. Because fluid intelligences cannot prevent all unexpected problems, 
both agents naturally make mistakes in business deals, but the probability that Agent 1 
makes a mistake is lower than that of Agent 2.  
 During negotiations between Agents 1 and 2, many proposals or offers to reach 
an agreement are presented by each agent. Suppose that the probability that a proposal is 
advantageous to Agent 1 is x (0 < x < 0.5) and the probability that it is advantageous to 
Agent 2 is also x (0 < x < 0.5); that is, proposals are, on average, neutral for both Agents 
1 and 2. Hence, the probability that a proposal is neither advantageous nor 
disadvantageous to both agents is equally 1 − 2𝑥 for both agents. 
 It is assumed that the probability that Agent i (= 1, 2) judges that a proposal is 
advantageous even if it is actually disadvantageous is pi, and the probability that Agent i 
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wrongly judges that it is disadvantageous even if it is actually advantageous is also pi. 
That is, the probability that Agent i makes a mistake is pi. Mistakes are made by agents 
regardless of misleading conducts of the opposing agents. In the model, misleading 
conducts are only described by heterogeneity in honesty as will be explained below. In 
addition, if a proposal is neither advantageous nor disadvantageous to both agents, the 
probability that Agent i wrongly judges that it is disadvantageous is 0.5pi, and the 
probability that Agent i wrongly judges that it is advantageous is also 0.5pi. Therefore, 
the probability that Agent i correctly judges that a proposed deal is neither advantageous 
nor disadvantageous is 1 − 𝑝𝑖. Because the fluid intelligence of Agent 1 is higher than 
that of Agent 2, p2 > p1.     
 In addition, suppose that Agent 1 is honest with the probability q1 (0 ≤ 𝑞1 ≤ 1) 
and dishonest with the probability 1 − 𝑞1, and Agent 2 is honest with the probability q2 
(0 ≤ 𝑞2 ≤ 1) and dishonest with the probability 1 − 𝑞2. Here, an “honest” agent is one 
who, if he recognizes that the other agent is making a mistake, informs the other agent of 
the mistake. Conversely, a “dishonest” agent covertly aims to exploit any opportunity the 
other agent provides (i.e., it never informs the other agent of any mistakes). As mentioned 
above, it is assumed for simplicity that the effect of misleading conduct is reflected not 
in pi but only in qi in the model. This means that misleading conducts are represented only 
by being dishonest after mistakes were made by the opposing agent. In addition, the 
probability pi does not change regardless of whether the opposing agent is more honest or 
not. Of course, an honest agent can only inform the other agent of a mistake if the agent 
recognizes the other agent’s mistake. Suppose that the probability that Agent i recognizes 
a mistake made by Agent j is 1 − 𝑝𝑖 for any i and j (i ≠ j).  
 If both agents are dishonest, the probability that Agent 1 accepts a proposal and 
an agreement is reached (𝑃1,1−𝑞1,1−𝑞2) is  
 
                   𝑃1,1−𝑞1,1−𝑞2 = 𝑥(1 − 𝑝1)𝑝2  
                             +(1 − 2𝑥)(1 − 𝑝1)(1 − 𝑝2) 
                           +𝑥𝑝1(1 − 𝑝2) .                                                       (1) 
 
The first term in equation (1) indicates the case that the proposal is advantageous to Agent 
1 (i.e., x), and Agent 1 does not make a mistake (i.e., 1 − 𝑝1) but Agent 2 does make a 
mistake (i.e., p2). The second term indicates the case that the proposal is neither 
advantageous nor disadvantageous (i.e., 1 − 2𝑥), and both agents do not make a mistake 
(i.e., 1 − 𝑝1  and 1 − 𝑝2). The third term in equation (1) indicates the case that the 
proposal is disadvantageous to Agent 1 (i.e., x) and Agent 1 makes a mistake (i.e., p1), 
but Agent 2 does not make a mistake (i.e., 1 − 𝑝2).  
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 Next, if Agent 1 is honest but Agent 2 is dishonest, the probability that Agent 1 
accepts a proposal and an agreement is reached (𝑃1,𝑞1,1−𝑞2) is  
 
                   𝑃1,𝑞1,1−𝑞2 = 𝑥(1 − 𝑝1)𝑝2𝑝1 
                           +(1 − 2𝑥)(1 − 𝑝1)(1 − 𝑝2) 
                           +𝑥𝑝1(1 − 𝑝2) 
                        +(1 − 2𝑥)(1 − 𝑝1)𝑝2(1 − 𝑝1) .                                (2) 
 
The first term in equation (2) is different from that in equation (1) because honest Agent 
1 informs Agent 2 of any mistake with the probability 1 − 𝑝1; even if Agent 1 is honest, 
however, Agent 1 cannot inform Agent 2 of any mistake with the probability 𝑝1. The 
second and third terms in equation (2) are the same as those in equation (1). The fourth 
term indicates the case where the proposal is neither advantageous nor disadvantageous 
(i.e., 1 − 2𝑥), and only Agent 2 makes a mistake with the probability (1 − 𝑝1)𝑝2, but 
honest Agent 1 informs Agent 2 of the mistake with the probability 1 − 𝑝1. 
 Third, if Agent 1 is dishonest but Agent 2 is honest, the probability that Agent 1 
accepts a proposal and the agreement is reached (𝑃1,1−𝑞1,𝑞2) is  
 
                   𝑃1,1−𝑞1,𝑞2 = 𝑥(1 − 𝑝1)𝑝2 
                           +(1 − 2𝑥)(1 − 𝑝1)(1 − 𝑝2) 
                           +𝑥𝑝1(1 − 𝑝2)𝑝2 
                        +(1 − 2𝑥)𝑝1(1 − 𝑝2)(1 − 𝑝2) .                               (3) 
 
The first and second terms in equation (3) are the same as those in equation (1). The third 
term in equation (3) is different from that in equation (1), because honest Agent 2 informs 
Agent 1 of any mistake with the probability 1 − 𝑝2; even if Agent 2 is honest, however, 
Agent 2 cannot inform Agent 1 of a mistake with the probability 𝑝2. The fourth term in 
equation (3) indicates the case where the proposal is neither advantageous nor 
disadvantageous (i.e., 1 − 2𝑥) and only Agent 1 makes a mistake with the probability 𝑝1(1 − 𝑝2), but honest Agent 2 informs Agent 1 of the mistake with the probability 1 −𝑝2. 
 Finally, if both agents are honest, the probability that Agent 1 accepts a proposal 
and an agreement is reached (𝑃1,𝑞1,𝑞2) is  
 
                    𝑃1,𝑞1,𝑞2 = 𝑥(1 − 𝑝1)𝑝2𝑝1 
                          +(1 − 2𝑥)(1 − 𝑝1)(1 − 𝑝2) 
                          +𝑥𝑝1(1 − 𝑝2)𝑝2 
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                          +(1 − 2𝑥)(1 − 𝑝1)𝑝2(1 − 𝑝1)  
                         +(1 − 2𝑥)𝑝1(1 − 𝑝2)(1 − 𝑝2) .                                 (4) 
 
The first and fourth terms in equation (4) are the same as those in equation (2). The second 
term in equation (4) is the same as that in equation (1). The third and fifth terms in 
equation (4) are the same as the third and fourth terms, respectively, in equation (3).  
 Hence, the overall probability that Agent 1 accepts a proposal and an agreement 
is reached (P1) is  
 𝑃1 = (1 − 𝑞1)(1 − 𝑞2)𝑃1,1−𝑞1,1−𝑞2+𝑞1(1 − 𝑞2) 𝑃1,𝑞1,1−𝑞2 + (1 − 𝑞1)𝑞2𝑃1,1−𝑞1,𝑞2 +𝑞1𝑞2𝑃1,𝑞1,𝑞2 .                                                                               (5) 
 
 Similarly, the probability that Agent 2 accepts a proposal and an agreement is 
reached (𝑃2,1−𝑞1,1−𝑞2) if both agents are dishonest is  
 
                   𝑃2,1−𝑞1,1−𝑞2 = 𝑥𝑝1(1 − 𝑝2) 
                             +(1 − 2𝑥)(1 − 𝑝1)(1 − 𝑝2) 
                           +𝑥(1 − 𝑝1)𝑝2 .                                                      (6) 
 
If Agent 1 is honest but Agent 2 is dishonest, the probability that Agent 2 accepts a 
proposal and an agreement is reached (𝑃2,𝑞1,1−𝑞2) is  
 
                   𝑃2,𝑞1,1−𝑞2 = 𝑥𝑝1(1 − 𝑝2) 
                           +(1 − 2𝑥)(1 − 𝑝1)(1 − 𝑝2) 
                           +𝑥(1 − 𝑝1)𝑝2𝑝1 
                        +(1 − 2𝑥)(1 − 𝑝1)𝑝2(1 − 𝑝1) .                               (7) 
 
If Agent 1 is dishonest but Agent 2 is honest, the probability that Agent 2 accepts a 
proposal and an agreement is reached (𝑃2,1−𝑞1,𝑞2) is  
 
                   𝑃2,1−𝑞1,𝑞2 = 𝑥𝑝1(1 − 𝑝2)𝑝2 
                           +(1 − 2𝑥)(1 − 𝑝1)(1 − 𝑝2) 
                           +𝑥(1 − 𝑝1)𝑝2 
                        +(1 − 2𝑥)𝑝1(1 − 𝑝2)(1 − 𝑝2) .                               (8) 
 
If both agents are honest, the probability that Agent 2 accepts a proposal and an agreement 
is reached (𝑃2,𝑞1,𝑞2) is  
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                    𝑃2,𝑞1,𝑞2 = 𝑥𝑝1(1 − 𝑝2)𝑝2 
                          +(1 − 2𝑥)(1 − 𝑝1)(1 − 𝑝2) 
                          +𝑥(1 − 𝑝1)𝑝2𝑝1 
                          +(1 − 2𝑥)(1 − 𝑝1)𝑝2(1 − 𝑝1)  
                         +(1 − 2𝑥)𝑝1(1 − 𝑝2)(1 − 𝑝2) .                                 (9) 
 
 Hence, the overall probability that Agent 2 accepts a proposal and an agreement 
is reached (P2) is  
 𝑃2 = (1 − 𝑞1)(1 − 𝑞2)𝑃2,1−𝑞1,1−𝑞2+𝑞1(1 − 𝑞2) 𝑃2,𝑞1,1−𝑞2 + (1 − 𝑞1)𝑞2𝑃2,1−𝑞1,𝑞2 +𝑞1𝑞2𝑃2,𝑞1,𝑞2.                                                                                                   (10) 
 
4.2  Persistent economic rents  
If an agreement is objectively a win for Agent i (i.e., an advantageous deal), Agent i 
obtains the economic rents from that deal. Let z be the amount of these rents, and suppose 
that z is identical for any agreement. Conversely, if a deal is objectively a defeat for Agent 
i, Agent i suffers losses equivalent to −𝑧 for any agreement. Even if a deal is an objective 
loss, the agents can only recognize a defeat at a later point in time or perhaps never 
recognize it, as discussed in Section 2.1.1. 
 
4.2.1  Economic rents under heterogeneous fluid intelligences 
4.2.1.1  Economic rents of Agent 1 
The probability that Agent 1 accepts a proposal (P1) is shown by equation (5), but the 
acceptance itself does not mean that Agent 1 will obtain the economic rents. Rents are 
obtained only when the deal is advantageous and no mistake is made (i.e., 𝑥(1 − 𝑝1)); if 
it is disadvantageous and mistakes are made (i.e., 𝑥𝑝1), Agent 1 is exploited. If the deal 
is neither advantageous nor disadvantageous (i.e., 1 −2𝑥 ), no rents are generated. 
Therefore, by equations (1)–(5), the expected economic rents of Agent 1 in a business 
deal, 𝐸(𝑍1), are  
 𝐸(𝑍1) =  (1 − 𝑞1)(1 − 𝑞2){𝑧𝑥(1 − 𝑝1)𝑝2 + 0 × (1 − 2𝑥)(1 − 𝑝1)(1 − 𝑝2) − z𝑥𝑝1(1 − 𝑝2)}  +𝑞1(1 − 𝑞2) {𝑧𝑥(1 − 𝑝1)𝑝2𝑝1 + 0 × (1 − 2𝑥)(1 − 𝑝1)(1 − 𝑝2) − z𝑥𝑝1(1 − 𝑝2)+0 × (1 − 2𝑥)(1 − 𝑝1)𝑝2(1 − 𝑝1) }   +(1 − 𝑞1)𝑞2 {𝑧𝑥(1 − 𝑝1)𝑝2 + 0 × (1 − 2𝑥)(1 − 𝑝1)(1 − 𝑝2) − z𝑥𝑝1(1 − 𝑝2)𝑝2+0 × (1 − 2𝑥)𝑝1(1 − 𝑝2)(1 − 𝑝2) }   
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+𝑞1𝑞2 { 𝑧𝑥(1 − 𝑝1)𝑝2𝑝1 + 0 × (1 − 2𝑥)(1 − 𝑝1)(1 − 𝑝2) − z𝑥𝑝1(1 − 𝑝2)𝑝2+0 × (1 − 2𝑥)(1 − 𝑝1)𝑝2(1 − 𝑝1) + 0 × (1 − 2𝑥)𝑝1(1 − 𝑝2)(1 − 𝑝2)}      = 𝑧𝑥{𝑝2 − 𝑝1 + 𝑞2𝑝1 − 𝑞1𝑝2 + 𝑝1𝑝2[𝑞2𝑝2−𝑞1𝑝1 + 2(𝑞1 − 𝑞2)]} .                        (11) 
 
 If 𝑞1 = 𝑞2 = 1 (i.e., both agents are always honest), by equation (11),  
 𝐸(𝑍1) = 𝑧𝑥[𝑝1𝑝2(𝑝2 − 𝑝1)]>0                                       (12) 
 
because p2 > p1. Inequality (12) is important because it indicates that even if both agents 
are always honest, Agent 1 persistently obtains economic rents and Agent 2 is persistently 
exploited because p2 > p1, which means that heterogeneity in fluid intelligence is the 
essential origin of the economic rents.  
 If 𝑞1 = 𝑞2 = 0 (i.e., both agents are always dishonest), by equation (11), 
 𝐸(𝑍1) = 𝑧𝑥[𝑝2 − 𝑝1] > 0                                           (13) 
 
because p2 > p1. Inequality (13) indicates that Agent 1 also persistently obtains the 
economic rents when both agents are always dishonest, as was the case when both agents 
are always honest.  
 Third, if 𝑞1 = 0 but 𝑞2 = 1 (i.e., Agent 1 is always dishonest but Agent 2 is 
always honest), by equation (11), 
   𝐸(𝑍1) = 𝑧𝑥𝑝2[1 − 𝑝1(2 − 𝑝2)] . 
 
Because 1 − 𝑝1(2 − 𝑝2) > 0 for any 0 < 𝑝1 < 𝑝2 < 1,  
   𝐸(𝑍1) > 0 . 
 
That is, Agent 1 again persistently obtains the economic rents. 
 Finally, if 𝑞1 = 1 but 𝑞2 = 0 (i.e., Agent 1 is always honest but Agent 2 is 
always dishonest), by equation (11), 
   𝐸(𝑍1) = 𝑧𝑥𝑝1[𝑝2(2 − 𝑝1) − 1] . 
 
Let 𝑝2 = 𝛾𝑝1 where 𝛾 > 1. The solution of  
 𝑝2(2 − 𝑝1) − 1 = −1 + 2𝑝1 − 𝛾𝑝12 = 0 
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is 
   𝑝1 = 1 − √1 − 𝛾−1 = 1 − √1 − 𝑝1𝑝2  , 
 
and therefore if  
   𝑝2 > 12 − 𝑝1  , 
 
then 
   𝐸(𝑍1) > 0 , 
 
but if 
  𝑝2 < 12 − 𝑝1  , 
 
then 
 𝐸(𝑍1) < 0 .                                                         (14) 
 
Inequality (14) indicates that if Agent 1 is always honest but Agent 2 is always dishonest, 
for some values of γ, Agent 2 obtains the economic rents even if p2 > p1. 
 Here,  
 𝑑𝐸(𝑍1)𝑑𝑞1 = −𝑧𝑥𝑝2(𝑝1 − 1)2 < 0 ,                                    (15) 
 
and  
 𝑑𝐸(𝑍1)𝑑𝑞2 = 𝑧𝑥𝑝1(𝑝2 − 1)2 > 0 .                                     (16) 
 
Inequalities (15) and (16) indicate that as Agent 1 is more often honest (i.e., as 𝑞1 
increases), the economic rents of Agent 1 𝐸(𝑍1) decrease, and as Agent 2 is more often 
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dishonest (i.e., as 𝑞2  decreases), the rents of Agent 1 also decrease. If Agent 2 is 
dishonest sufficiently frequently, Agent 1 may be exploited by Agent 2, as inequality (14) 
indicates. However, as inequality (13) indicates, even if Agent 2 is always dishonest, if 
Agent 1 is also always dishonest (i.e., 𝑞1 = 𝑞2 = 0) then Agent 1 will persistently obtain 
the economic rents because p2 > p1.  
 
4.2.1.2  Economic rents of Agent 2 
The expected economic rents of Agent 2 in a business deal, 𝐸(𝑍2), are similarly, by 
equations (6)–(10), 
 𝐸(𝑍2) = 𝑧𝑥{𝑝1−𝑝2 − 𝑞2𝑝1 + 𝑞1𝑝2 + 𝑝1𝑝2[𝑞1𝑝1 − 𝑞2𝑝2 − 2(𝑞1 − 𝑞2)]} .    (17) 
 
 If 𝑞1 = 𝑞2 = 1 (i.e., both agents are always honest), by equation (17),  
 𝐸(𝑍2) = 𝑧𝑥[𝑝1𝑝2(𝑝1 − 𝑝2)]<0                                       (18) 
 
because p2 > p1. That is, if both agents are always honest, Agent 2 is persistently exploited, 
as inequality (18) indicates. If 𝑞1 = 𝑞2 = 0 (i.e., both agents are always dishonest), by 
equation (17), 
 𝐸(𝑍2) = 𝑧𝑥(𝑝1 − 𝑝2) < 0                       (19) 
 
because p2 > p1. That is, if both agents are always dishonest, Agent 2 is also persistently 
exploited as inequality (19) indicates. If 𝑞1 = 0 but 𝑞2 = 1 (i.e., Agent 1 is always 
dishonest but Agent 2 is always honest), by equation (17), 
   𝐸(𝑍2) = 𝑧𝑥𝑝2[𝑝1(2 − 𝑝2) − 1] . 
 
Because there is no solution for  
   𝑝1(2 − 𝑝2) − 1 = 2𝑝1 − 𝛾𝑝12 − 1 = −1 + 2𝑝1 − 𝛾𝑝12 = 0 , 
 
then 
   𝐸(𝑍2) < 0 . 
 
That is, Agent 2 is again persistently exploited. Finally, if 𝑞1 = 1 but 𝑞2 = 0 (i.e., 
Agent 1 is always honest but Agent 2 is always dishonest), by equation (17), 
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   𝐸(𝑍2) = 𝑧𝑥𝑝1[1 − 𝑝2(2 − 𝑝1)] . 
 
Hence, opposite to the case of 𝐸(𝑍1), if 
   𝑝2 > 12 − 𝑝1  , 
 
then 
   𝐸(𝑍2) < 0 , 
 
but if 
   𝑝2 < 12 − 𝑝1  , 
 
then 
 𝐸(𝑍2) > 0 .                                                         (20) 
 
Inequality (20) indicates that if Agent 1 is always honest but Agent 2 is always dishonest, 
for some values of γ, Agent 2 can obtain the economic rents even if p2 > p1. 
 Here, 
 𝑑𝐸(𝑍2)𝑑𝑞1 = 𝑧𝑥𝑝2[1 − 𝑝1(2 − 𝑝1)]>0 ,                                 (21) 
 
and 
 𝑑𝐸(𝑍2)𝑑𝑞2 = 𝑧𝑥𝑝1[𝑝2(2 − 𝑝2) − 1] <0 .                                (22) 
 
Inequalities (21) and (22) indicate that, as Agent 1 is more often honest (as 𝑞1 increases), 
the suffering of Agent 2 decreases (i.e., 𝐸(𝑍2) increases); as Agent 2 is more often 
dishonest (i.e., as 𝑞2 decreases), the suffering again decreases. Furthermore, if Agent 2 
is sufficiently frequently dishonest, Agent 2 may obtain the positive economic rents as 
inequality (20) indicates. However, as inequality (19) indicates, even if Agent 2 is always 
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dishonest, if Agent 1 is also always dishonest (i.e., 𝑞1 = 𝑞2 = 0), Agent 1 still can 
persistently obtain the economic rents because p2 > p1.  
 
4.2.2  How honest are economic agents? 
The results in Section 4.2.1 indicate that if an economic agent is honest more frequently 
than another agent, the agent may gain less economic rent or suffer more losses. In 
addition, inequalities (12) and (18) indicate that, if the fluid intelligence of an economic 
agent is very low compared with that of another agent, the former agent will be inevitably 
exploited in most cases, even if both agents are always honest. That is, being honest is 
clearly disadvantageous for economic agents—particularly for those with relatively low 
fluid intelligences. Therefore, it seems true that agents with relatively low fluid 
intelligences are strongly motivated to be dishonest as often as possible in business 
dealings. Similarly, agents with relatively high fluid intelligences also have incentive to 
be dishonest. 
 Therefore, it is highly unlikely that all agents are always honest. Moreover, it is 
highly likely that most agents are often dishonest in business dealings (i.e., 𝑞𝑖 > 0). 
 
4.2.3  Roles of asymmetric information and irrationality 
As discussed in the Introduction, in contract theory, exploitative contracting is often 
explained on the basis of the concept of asymmetric information or irrationality. However, 
the results in Sections 2, 3, and 4 indicate that the economic rents derived from mistakes 
are generated without the need for asymmetric information and irrationality. Furthermore, 
even if all agents are always honest (i.e., without any malicious intent), economic rents 
are generated. These economic rents are generate by heterogeneity in fluid intelligence 
even in the absence of assumptions of asymmetric information and irrationality.  
 The factor of misleading conduct that is represented by heterogeneity in honesty 
in this paper aggravates the situation, as do the elements of asymmetric information and 
irrationality. In particular, malicious agents can intentionally utilize asymmetric 
information and irrationality to amplify and maximize economic rents.  
 
4.2.4  Economic rents under identical fluid intelligence  
What will happen if fluid intelligence is homogeneous among economic agents? Suppose 
that 𝑝1 = 𝑝2 = ?̅? (i.e., the fluid intelligences of Agents 1 and 2 are identical) but 𝑞1 ≠𝑞2 (i.e., their degrees of honesty are different). By equations (11) and (17), the expected 
economic rents of Agents 1 and 2 are respectively  
 𝐸(𝑍1) = 𝑧𝑥(𝑞2 − 𝑞1)?̅?(?̅? − 1)2 ,                                      (23) 
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and 
 𝐸(𝑍2) = 𝑧𝑥(𝑞1 − 𝑞2)?̅?(?̅? − 1)2 .                                      (24) 
 
Inequalities (23) and (24) indicate that, if Agent 2 is more honest than Agent 1 (i.e., 𝑞1 <𝑞2), Agent 1 obtains the economic rents and Agent 2 is exploited (i.e., 𝐸(𝑍1) > 0 and 𝐸(𝑍2) < 0), but if Agent 1 is more honest than Agent 2 (i.e., 𝑞1 > 𝑞2), Agent 2 obtains 
the economic rents and Agent 1 is exploited (i.e., 𝐸(𝑍1) < 0 and 𝐸(𝑍2) > 0).  
 If not only fluid intelligences but also honesty are identical (i.e., 𝑝1 = 𝑝2 and 𝑞1 = 𝑞2), by equations (11) and (17), 
   𝐸(𝑍1) = 0 , 
 
and 
   𝐸(𝑍2) = 0 . 
 
That is, no economic rent from mistakes is generated.  
 
4.3  Fluid intelligence and persistent economic rents 
Sections 3 and 4.2 indicate that, because of intrinsic heterogeneity in fluid intelligence 
and the consequent heterogeneity in people’s mistake-making behavior, some economic 
agents can persistently obtain economic rents from other agents’ mistakes in business 
deals. These persistent economic rents from mistakes will exist ubiquitously and probably 
at a large scale in an economy. As will be shown in Section 5, this persistence is very 
important from the point of view of economic inequality, particularly because it has 
significantly negative effects on economic inequality. 
 
5  SUSTAINABLE HETEROGENEITY AND 
RENTS FROM MISTAKES IN BUSINESS DEALS 
 
5.1  Heterogeneity in obtaining persistent economic rents 
5.1.1  Persistent economic rents 
A heterogeneous pi indicates a heterogeneous population, and a heterogeneous population 
indicates the possibility that there is no steady state or balanced growth path except for 
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corner solutions (Becker 1980; Harashima, 2014, 2017, 2020a). 1  Nevertheless, 
Harashima (2014, 2017, 2020a) showed that there is a state (or balanced growth path) in 
which all the optimality conditions of all heterogeneous households are satisfied and 
“sustainable heterogeneity” (SH) is achieved. As Harashima (2020a) showed, the state in 
which SH is achieved is the unique socially optimal state for almost all generally usable 
(i.e., preferences are complete, transitive, and continuous) social welfare functions in an 
economy with a heterogeneous population. 
 Although SH is naturally achieved only if household (worker) productivities are 
heterogeneous, SH is not naturally achieved if household preferences are heterogeneous. 
With heterogeneous preferences, a devastating state of extreme economic inequality is 
generated unless a government appropriately intervenes in the economy to achieve SH 
(Harashima, 2020a). In addition, Harashima (2020d) showed that heterogeneity in 
abilities to obtain persistent economic rents also results in the same state as the case of 
heterogeneous preferences without appropriate government interventions.  
 Although heterogeneous fluid intelligences will certainly result in heterogeneous 
productivities, they may not result in heterogeneous preferences. Hence, at first glance, 
SH may appear to be naturally achieved even if fluid intelligences are heterogeneous, but 
that is not the case. As shown in Sections 3 and 4, heterogeneity in fluid intelligence 
generates heterogeneity not only in productivity but also in the abilities to obtain 
persistent economic rents from mistakes in business dealings. Therefore, if fluid 
intelligences are heterogeneous, SH is not necessarily naturally achieved.  
 
5.1.2  Family lines 
The reason economic rents from mistakes are persistent is that fluid intelligences are 
highly likely given exogenously and change little over time. Nevertheless, the human 
lifespan is limited. Therefore, if fluid intelligences are given exogenously but randomly, 
the effect of the persistency will be nil, on average, in the long run. However, fluid 
intelligence may not necessarily be given randomly. Family lines consist of households 
that are descended from common ancestors and that share similar traits. In addition, in 
accordance with custom, and for other reasons, many groups of people mostly marry 
within the same or similar groups. Therefore, it is highly likely that fluid intelligences are 
exogenously given with bias. 
 Because of the bias, the average fluid intelligence of people in a given group (or 
family line) will basically be indefinitely different from those in other groups. This means 
that there are groups (or family lines) that indefinitely obtain the persistent economic rents 
                                                     
1 Harashima (2017) is also available in English as Harashima (2010), and Harashima (2020a) is also 
available in English as Harashima (2012a). 
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from mistakes in business deals. At the same time, there are groups (or family lines) that 
are indefinitely exploited.      
 
5.2  Extreme economic inequality 
5.2.1  Extreme economic inequality 
As shown in Sections 3.3 and 4.2, the economic rents from mistakes in business dealings 
most likely exist widely and on a large scale. Nevertheless, it is not the scale that is 
important—it is the persistence. Harashima (2020d) showed that temporary economic 
rents have no effect on SH, but persistent ones greatly affect SH, to the extent that SH 
cannot be achieved.  
 The economic agents who can persistently obtain economic rents (in this case, 
those with relatively high fluid intelligence) eventually become extremely rich, whereas 
those who are persistently exploited (those with relatively low fluid intelligence) 
eventually become extremely poor. That is, because of the persistent nature of the 
situation, extreme economic inequality is naturally generated.  
 
5.2.2  Built-in mechanism that naturally generates extreme economic 
inequality 
Heterogeneity in fluid intelligence causes heterogeneities, not only in productivity 
(Harashima, 2020c)2 but also in the rate of time preference (RTP) (Harashima, 2020b); 
in economic rents from ranking preference and value (Harashima, 2020d); and (as 
discussed in this paper) in the economic rents from mistakes made in business transactions.
 Among these heterogeneities, heterogeneity in productivity does not have a great 
effect on SH and thereby does not generate extreme economic inequality. It does, however, 
generate a moderate economic inequality in the sense that a household’s incomes and 
wealth are proportional to its productivity (Harashima, 2014, 2017, 2020a). Judging only 
from the perspective of productivity, therefore, being very poor may be condemned as 
being the result of a household’s own characteristics; that is, it is the poor who are to 
blame for their poverty, not society or the economic system. 
 However, heterogeneities in RTP and economic rents result in an extreme 
economic inequality regardless of household characteristics, even if the magnitudes of 
the heterogeneities are small, unless a government appropriately intervenes (Harashima, 
2014, 2017, 2020a, 2020d). Hence, the very existence of heterogeneity in fluid 
intelligence means that a mechanism that naturally generates extreme economic 
                                                     
2 Harashima (2020c) is also available in English as Harashima (2012b). 
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inequality is built into an economy from the beginning. Extreme economic inequality 
therefore is not necessarily the result of household characteristics (e.g., work ethic or risk 
tolerance). 
 
5.3  Government interventions 
Nevertheless, extreme economic inequality is not necessarily inevitable. We can escape 
from it if a government appropriately intervenes in its economy (Harashima, 2020d). In 
fact, government interventions are indispensable to escaping from it. Because the origin 
of the persistent economic rents from mistakes in business dealings is heterogeneity in 
fluid intelligence, part of the incomes generated by agents with higher fluid intelligence 
should be redistributed (transferred) by the government to those with lower fluid 
intelligences.  
 
5.3.1  Government transfers 
Suppose that there are two economies (Economy 1 and Economy 2) in a country. Each 
economy represents a group of identical households, and the two economies are identical 
except for household fluid intelligence. The fluid intelligence of a household in Economy 
1 is higher than that in Economy 2. Therefore, persistent economic rents from mistakes 
in business deals are generated, and government intervention is required to achieve SH. 
Let 𝑧𝑡 = 𝑧̅𝑘1,𝑡 be the per capita persistent rents of households in Economy 1, where ki,t 
is the per capita capital of households in Economy i (= 1, 2) in period t and 𝑧̅ (> 0) is 
a constant. As Harashima (2020d) indicates, the RTPs of households are also 
heterogeneous between the two economies because fluid intelligences are heterogeneous. 
Let 𝜃𝑖 be the RTP of Economy i (= 1, 2). 
 The government intervenes by transferring money or other economic resources 
between the two economies to achieve SH. The per capita transfer from households in 
Economy 1 to households in Economy 2 in period t is gt, and it is assumed that gt depends 
on capital such that  
  g𝑡 = g̅𝑡𝑘1,𝑡 . 
 
g̅𝑡 is an exogenous variable for households and firms and is appropriately adjusted by the 
government in every period so as to achieve SH. Through arbitrage in markets, 𝑘1,𝑡 =𝑘2,𝑡 and ?̇?1,𝑡 = ?̇?2,𝑡 are kept, and therefore, 
  g𝑡 = g̅𝑡𝑘1,𝑡 = g̅𝑡𝑘2,𝑡 . 
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 Harashima (2020d) showed that, to achieve SH, the government has to 
manipulate the value of g̅ such that  
 lim𝑡→∞g̅𝑡 = 𝑧̅ + 𝜃2 − 𝜃12  .                                           (25) 
 
Here, if there are no persistent economic rents, the value of g̅ is  
 lim𝑡→∞g̅𝑡 = 𝜃2 − 𝜃12                                                      (26) 
 
as shown by Harashima (2020a). Unlike in equation (26), 𝑧̅ is included in equation (25). 
To achieve SH, therefore, the government has to transfer the entire amount of persistent 
economic rents (𝑧𝑡 = 𝑧̅𝑘1,𝑡) from households in Economy 1 to households in Economy 
2 in each period.3 
 The results in the models with more than two economies are basically the same 
as those in the two-economy model. Suppose that there are H economies (Economy 1, 
Economy 2, … , Economy H) in a country. Each economy represents a group of identical 
households, and all the economies are identical except for the fluid intelligences of 
households. Harashima (2020d) showed that SH requires government transfers (positive 
or negative) from a household in Economy 1+2+ ∙ ∙ ∙ + (H – 1) to households in Economy 
H by 
 
 lim𝑡→∞g̅𝑡 = 𝜃𝐻 − ∑ 𝜃𝑞𝐻−1𝑞=1𝐻 − 1𝐻 − 𝑧̅𝐻 − 1  ,                                   (27) 
 
where Economy 1+2+ ∙ ∙ ∙ + (H – 1) is the combined economy of Economy 1, Economy 
2, …, and Economy (H – 1), and SH is satisfied among these economies.4 In this case, 
conversely, the amount of government transfers (positive or negative) from a household 
in Economy H to households in Economy 1+2+ ∙ ∙ ∙ + (H – 1) is  
 −(𝐻 − 1) 𝑘1+2+⋯+(𝐻−1),𝑡 lim𝑡→∞g̅𝑡 =  𝑘1+2+⋯+(𝐻−1),𝑡 [(∑ 𝜃𝑞𝐻−1𝑞=1𝐻−1 −𝜃𝐻) + 𝑧̅] , 
 
where 𝑘1+2+⋯+(𝐻−1),𝑡 is the capital of a household in Economy 1+2+ ∙ ∙ ∙ + (H – 1) in 
                                                     
3 Households in Economy 2 share the transfer equally with each other. 
4 Households in Economy H share the transfers equally with each other. 
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period t and is equal to 𝑘𝐻,𝑡.5  
 Equations (25) and (27) indicate that the appropriate government interventions 
(i.e., the appropriate transfer of zt in each period) are indispensable to achieve SH and 
prevent extreme economic inequality. An important point is that the scale of the economic 
rents does not matter. Even if the sum of the economic rents in the country is not large, 
the economic rents eventually generate extreme economic inequality unless the 
government appropriately intervenes, as equations (25) and (27) indicate.  
 Another important point is that, as discussed in Section 3.4, it seems likely that 
the economic rents derived from agents engaging in intentionally misleading conduct are 
far larger than those derived from simply having relatively high fluid intelligences. As 
discussed, these types of misleading conduct are legal, at least practically, but they may 
not be ethical, which means that justice does not necessarily prevail. In this sense, 
interventions to remove the negative effects of misleading conduct and to achieve SH are 
indispensable missions of government. 
 
5.3.2  Types of government interventions 
As indicated in Section 5.3.1, government transfers are effective, but is it possible for a 
government to directly ban these economic rents themselves by strengthening 
government regulations? It may be possible to some extent, but it probably would require 
an extremely large amount of money to do so. It would be very difficult for a government 
to transfer money between the parties concerned for each individual deal (contract) in 
business as each contract is made. In some cases, such as in the case of egregious 
malicious conduct, a government will of course directly intervene in individual contracts. 
In addition, governments will regularly caution consumers not to make mistakes and be 
exploited in conducting business. However, in most cases, a government does not have 
the resources to be able to directly intervene in all contracts. Therefore, the necessary 
government intervention is not the strengthening of regulations but income redistribution 
ex post. As a result, government transfers to remove the negative effects of these 
economic rents will be implemented as part of an overall package or scheme of income 
redistribution to achieve SH, for example, through a progressive income tax and an 
inheritance tax (Harashima, 2020e). 
 
6  CONCLUDING REMARKS 
 
According to contract theory, if economic agents are heterogeneous in behaviors with 
                                                     
5 Households in Economy 1+2+ ∙ ∙ ∙ + (H – 1) share the transfer equally with each other. 
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regard to making decisions in business transactions, competition in markets cannot 
sufficiently protect naïve consumers, and therefore some obtain economic rents while 
others are exploited. The reason for exploitative contracting is often explained by using 
the concepts of asymmetric information and irrationality (or bounded rationality).  
 In this paper, I show that the economic rents from mistakes in business dealings 
are essentially generated by heterogeneity in fluid intelligence among economic agents. 
These economic rents include not only those from exploitative contracting but also those 
obtained without any malicious intent. The model in this paper indicates that 
heterogeneity in fluid intelligence generates heterogeneity in mistake-making behavior in 
business dealings. An economic agent who makes fewer mistakes obtains the economic 
rents, and the one who makes more mistakes is exploited. Furthermore, an economic 
agent may win (i.e., gain economic rents) by intentionally misleading the other agent.  
Even without assuming asymmetric information and irrationality, economic 
rents from mistakes are generated. Furthermore, even if no economic agents have 
malicious intent and all agents are always honest, these rents are still generated because 
the essential origin of these economic rents is heterogeneity in fluid intelligence. 
Heterogeneity in honesty aggravates the situation, as do the misuse of asymmetric 
information and irrationality.  
 Economic rents derived from mistakes most likely exist widely and at a large 
scale across the economy. Furthermore, some households or family lines can persistently 
obtain economic rents with a higher probability than others. This persistency leads to an 
extreme economic inequality unless a government appropriately intervenes. That is, there 
is a built-in mechanism in the economy such that the level of economic inequality is 
naturally exacerbated to the limit. To avoid this situation, a government has to intervene 
in economic activities to remove the negative effect of these economic rents and achieve 
SH by appropriately redistributing incomes among households—for example, through a 
progressive income tax or an inheritance tax.  
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